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Global security and sustainability in the XXIst century depends on reducing dramatically 
the carbon content of economic activity in the next few decades. However, the world lacks 
an effective institutional framework to address global warming. While the Kyoto Protocol 
falls short of providing a workable solution even if its goals are attained, the last effort to 
update it, the Bali Conference on Climate Change in late 2007, failed to harness a clear 
global greenhouse-gases (GHG) mitigation schedule. 
Stabilization of greenhouse-gases (GHG) emissions is one angle of the broader issue of 
sustainable economic development. In a nutshell, climate warming is the result of a human 
interference with the biosphere’s ability to recycle greenhouse gases. These gases circulate 
inside the biosphere through a set of physical, chemical and biological processes that 
regulate their volume in the atmosphere. Humans produce only a small percentage of the 
total emitted GHG. By burning fossil fuels and reducing CO2 absorption through 
deforestation, economic activity seriously disrupts the balance of those natural processes, 
producing a net gain in the atmospheric concentration of these gases. Anthropogenic global 
warming illustrates the enormous physical unbalances produced by our civilization and 
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poses the problem of globally managing a free-access good in rapid process of exhaustion, 
and the possibilities of continuing with economic growth in a world of finite resources. 
Dealing successfully with climate change implies fundamentally two things. First, it 
requires reaching international consensus about differentiated mitigation schedules (i. e., a 
framework for regulating emission quotas). Second, it demands generating effective 
mechanisms at the national level for attaining those schedules. 
In this paper we examine the nature of the GHG stabilization problem and assess the limits 
of proposed market-based solutions. We argue that carbon trading is not an effective tool 
for addressing the problem of global warming, given the magnitude, speed, and complexity 
of the structural change required for global mitigation. In particular, we argue that carbon 
trading: a) implies an unjust privatization of the use of the atmosphere; b) it is based on 
flawed economic theory, and c) will deliver poor results in fostering systemic innovation 
towards a low-carbon economic structure.  
Stabilizing the greenhouse: facts and trends 
Global emissions greenhouse-gas (GHG) are accelerating, and with them the potential of 
global warming. Since the year 2000 global emissions have been growing far more rapidly 
than the worst scenarios projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC; see Rogner et al., 2007, and Raupach, et al., 2007). Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
concentration in the atmosphere has increased from ca. 280 parts per million (ppm) in 1750 
to 379 ppm in 2005. The growth rate of CO2 concentration augmented from 6.4 Giga-tons 
per year in the 1990’s to 7.2 Giga-tons per year in the period 2000-2005. If the trend of the 
last 20 years’ continues, human GHG emissions would increase between 40% and 60% 
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from 2000 to 2050, which will very likely produce an increase of between 2.5 and 4.5°C in 
the Earth’s mean temperature with respect to the year 2000 (Rogner, et al. 2007). 
Such apparently small changes in the mean global surface temperature will provoke 
profound and irreversible changes in climate patterns.
1
 Current atmospheric concentrations 
of the most powerful GHG (carbon dioxide and methane) are already at the highest levels 
registered in the last 450,000 years. Due to the large time scale of the climatic process and 
to feedback mechanisms between the climate subsystems, global warming will continue for 
centuries even if GHG concentrations stabilize at current levels. 
There is surging evidence that GHG emissions accumulated from the beginnings of 
industrial evolution have already produced long-term changes in Earth’s climate, like rising 
mean temperatures in the Arctic with shrinking ice surface in the Summer, glacier melting, 
changes in long term patterns of precipitation and droughts, generalized changes in extreme 
temperatures, and increase in cyclonic activity (see IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report, WGI, 
2007). Even though there is no scientific consensus, many observers argue that even an 
additional 2°C increase in global temperature (with respect to the 2000 level) is enough to 




According to a large number of climate models, the path to avoid dangerous climate change 
above a 2°C increase along the century is to stabilize GHG emissions, in terms of CO2 
equivalent, at the range of 450-500 ppm. To attain this, human GHG emissions must be 
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 To put it in perspective, mean global temperature differences between an Ice Ages and interglacial periods 
locate around 5°C. 
2
 See on this point Lenton et al (2008). The European Union definition of dangerous global surface 
temperature increase is 2°C with respect to the year 2000. Hansen et al. (2008) argue that a 1°C increase 
above 2000 levels would already constitute dangerous human interference with climate. 
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reduced between 60% and 80% by 2050, with respect to 2000 emissions (IPCC, Fourth 
Assessment Report, WGIII, 2007). In order to reach a stabilization plateau of 450-500 ppm 
of CO2 eq. by 2050, CO2 emissions must peak between 2000 and 2015.
3
 Weaker reductions 
will imply GHG stabilization at higher levels and higher temperature increase. In Table 1 
we summarize the possible stabilization scenarios and their impact on climate change. 
Considering current emission trends, it seems highly unlikely that the world will make it on 
time to reach the “safe” mitigation scenario (keeping concentration levels at 450-500 ppm). 
This is even more worrying when considering that the physical processes and the economic 
choices relevant for climate change have such long-lasting effects that they should be 
treated as irreversible (Schmalensee, 1998). Delaying mitigation efforts would demand 
faster rates of mitigation in the future. Therefore, mitigation efforts would have to proceed 
considerably faster than projected in that scenario.  
While the required effort looks overwhelming, several studies and assessments have 
concluded that available technical options could provide results that actually very close to 
those objectives (IPCC, 2007). Moreover, recent cost-benefit analysis supports the 
proposition that mitigation is not only less costly than facing the costs of climate change, 
but that it can actually produce incentives to economic growth.
4
 But such the widespread 
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 In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol scheduled a 5% reduction by 2012 with respect to 1990 levels, for the group 
of industrialized countries.  
4
 The most famous study of this kind is the Stern Report, which found that while costs of stabilization would 
range between 1% and 3% of GDP, costs of inaction would reach between 6 and 20%. Cost-benefit analysis 
for environmental regulation has been subjected to strong criticism and remains highly controversial. On the 
theoretical side, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002) identify four fundamental flaws of cost-benefit analysis: 1) 
Standard economic approaches to valuation are inaccurate and most of the time implausible; 2) the use of 
discounting improperly trivializes future harms and the irreversibility of certain environmental problems; 3) 
relying on aggregate, monetized benefits excludes the dimension of justice; 4) the value-laden and complex 
cost-benefit process is neither objective nor transparent. On the empirical side, it has been widely 
acknowledge that small differences in underlying modeling can yield totally different cost assessments. For 
example, in 2005 the Competitive Enterprise Institute stated that complying with the Kyoto Protocol would 
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process of technology adoption required for the transition to a lower-carbon carbon 
economy depends on a throughout reorganization of international production and 
consumption patterns, as well on a sound international framework for regulating emissions. 
Regulating global rights 
Emission cuts established in the Kyoto Protocol were based on a simple principle: rich 
countries should take action while poor ones skip reductions for the time being. Although 
physically insufficient and weakly enforceable, the Protocol constituted a successful first 
step to unlock the initial coordination trap produced by a situation of ubiquitous 
responsibility and global impact, where no country would take action before others did. 
Crucial for the negotiation was the recognition of two basic principles at United Nations 
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first is the precautionary 
principle, which justified action before having full and complete knowledge about the 
physics of climate change. The second is common but differentiated responsibility, 
according to the evidence of differential per capita emissions and income levels. Based on 
these same principles, this framework must be updated and retooled to secure a mitigation 
schedule that matches current knowledge about non-dangerous stabilization levels.  
International asymmetries in terms of per capita income, per capita emissions, and per 
capita energy-use remain strongly significant. Developing countries are responsible of only 
23% of global cumulative emissions since 1750 (Raupach, et al., 2007). However, recent 
trends show the high sensitivity of emissions to small changes in the pattern of world 
income levels, which has pulverized earlier “de-carbonization” trends (Grübler, 1994). 
                                                                                                                                                     
cost USD 300 billion per year to the US, 20% of GDP over 10 years. At the same time, for Amory Lovins 
reduction in carbon emissions would save USD 300 billion (quoted in Lohman, 2007, p. 115, not 192). 
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Despite meager gains in per capita income levels and of growing international divergence, 
developing countries account now for a considerable share of the increase in emissions 
(70% of emissions’ growth in 2004). Increasing energy demand and growing per capita 
income will increase the pressure on the Earth’s carbon cycling capacity just when curbing 
emissions will be most demanded. 
The surge of GHG emissions in large developing economies like China and India reflects 
the extent to which declining energy intensities have been offset by increasing carbon 
intensities and rapid economic growth. Such a pattern of rising carbon intensities has been 
attributed the acceleration of coal-based electricity generation and a rapidly growing 
transport sector fuelled by oil (Rogner, et al., 2007). However, in order to attain 
stabilization levels in GHG concentration between 450-500 ppm CO2-eq developing 
countries will anyway need to curb emissions shortly after developed countries do, in the 
next couple of decades (see Baer, Athanasiou and Kharta, 2007). 
While they are relatively less responsible of cumulative emissions, developing countries 
will suffer earlier and more strongly the impacts of climate change. All countries will need 
to adapt, but poor countries will have to do that earlier and with weaker adaptation 
capabilities and resources. While impacts on islands and coastal populations has been most 
publicized, objective danger gravitates on water resources, food security and human health, 
as well as on the sustainability of terrestrial and coastal ecosystems (UNFCCC, 2007). For 
example, the UNU Institute for Environment and Human Security predicts that the number 
of “environmental refugees” could grow from 20 million people in 2005 to 50 in 2010 and 
up to 150 million in 2050 (Myers, 2005). The UNFCCC estimated that investment flows 
required for adaptation are sum up billions of dollars per year, several decades from now, 
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and could reach more than USD 100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2007). In order to reduce 
adaptation costs, mitigation must proceed fast. 
A workable definition of common but differentiated responsibility cannot ignore these facts. 
The reluctant position to initiate emission reductions, held by most developing countries 
with the legitimate argument of having a right to development, is weakened when 
considering that a) global inaction will defeat any isolated development effort; b) developed 
countries, especially the U.S., will not commit to stronger mitigation if major developing 
countries do not follow suit. It is therefore in the highest interest of developing countries to 
foster mitigation solutions both in developed countries and in their own. 
There exist two important frameworks for updating the Kyoto Protocol. First, the 
Contraction and Convergence Framework (Meyer, 1997) establishes for each country a 
specific mitigation schedule that satisfies two conditions: securing global stabilization of 
GHG at 450 ppm by 2100 and gradual convergence to equal per capita emission levels. 
Complementary, the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework integrates the notion of 
global responsibility with that of national capacity (Baer, Athanasiou and Kharta, 2007). 
The first concept calculates the responsibility of each country on its share in global annual 
emissions; the second exempts all individuals living under a poverty line from sharing the 
burden of financing climate action. By including intra-country income differentials, this 
second approach addresses the fact that high-income individuals in poor countries have 
indeed a capability of contributing to mitigation. An integrated framework based on these 
two approaches could narrow down the most visible resistances to set up a renewed 
international agreement on climate change. 
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The reluctance of the United States to commit to quantitative emissions reductions remains 
the strongest obstacle to effective climate action. The U.S. exercise of the privileges of 
hegemony seems to have actually stretched out in the last decade. But it should not be 
forgotten that legitimacy is a condition of sustained hegemony. Awareness on this fact 
within the commanding structures in the U.S., at a moment when the international financial 
crisis strengthens the need to reorganize the world economic order, could open a window 
for articulated, effective international pressure to bring the U.S. into an improved climate 
deal. 
Technology and the fossil-fuel regime 
Global GHG mitigation implies, broadly speaking, increasing energy efficiency and 
reducing the carbon content of energy, as well as reducing deforestation and land use 
change. Even though energy use concentrates more than 50% of the GHG emissions 
sources, the latter are rather ubiquitous throughout the economy. In fact, mitigation at 
national levels implies to restructure multiple technological systems and practices, 
involving hundreds of different technologies.
5
. However, overall mitigation does show 
important generic aspects. 
According to the last report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
during the period 1970 to 2004 global emissions have risen as the combined effect of global 
income growth (77%) and global population growth (69%), which have surpassed the 
general decrease in energy intensity of GDP (-33%) and the almost null reduction in carbon 
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 A popular image is to represent carbon reductions in time coming from different sectors as “wedges.” (see 
Socolow and Pacala, 2006). While a useful start, these views are based on a static approach that cannot offer 
support for coherent mitigation strategies. 
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intensity of energy (-2%).
6
 In other words, “declining carbon and energy intensities have 
been unable to offset income effects and population growth” at a global scale, rising 
consequently carbon emissions (Rogner et al., 2007, p. 107). As can be appreciated from 
Graph 2, energy efficiency improvements have been persistent along the last 30 years, 
while changes in the fuel mix (and the carbon content of energy) are weak. These trends 
reflect the slow incremental improvement of a technological regime based on fossil energy, 
and its rigidity to change its fundamental principles. The different uses of energy have 




Many renewable energy sources are available now at costs that are not radically different 
from fossil fuels. However, there exist strong rigidities to phase-out the fossil-energy 
pattern. First, for a society that is headed to an ever-growing consumption of energy, fossil 
fuels have technical advantages over their substitutes: a very high energy density and a very 
high rate of energy return over energy investment; high flexibility and large variety of uses; 
ease of storage that allows a constant intensity of energy flows. These features allow the 
acceleration of production processes, their independence from other biological and social 
processes, and ultimately a “compression of time and space” that matches tightly the logic 
of capitalist accumulation (Altvater, 2006). Second, fossil fuels are abundant: reserves of 
conventional fossil fuels are large enough to secure a constant supply at current use levels 
over the next century (Cavaney, 2006; IPCC, 2007); non-conventional sources easily 
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 This calculus does not consider emissions derived from de-forestation and land-use change. 
7
 Energy transitions are driven by succession of technologies. Initiating from a very small scale of use, a new 
technical base gradually improves in efficiency and variety of applications, until it eventually replace the 
previous energy base. The emergence of a fossil-fueled economy is the result of a sequence of rising 
structures based on a dominant fuel (wood, coal, oil, and currently natural gas), along a path of increasing 
energy use during the last 250 years. These transitions depict changes in the relative weight of energy sources, 
rather than full replacement (the current transition from oil to gas includes as well a rebound in the use of 
coal). 
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duplicate those reserves. Third, there is a huge mass of sunken investments in the form 
physical and technical infrastructures specialized in the production, distribution, storage, 
transport, and consumption of fossil fuels, as well as in other less tangible long-life 
investments that provide cheap or inexpensive services to fossil-fuel systems. Sunken costs, 
the existence of specialized technological infrastructure, and inter-locked supply and 
demand are all factors that generate increasing returns to adoption of fossil technologies, 
locking-in future technological choices to fossil energy sources. These rigidities tend to 
reinforce each other in such a way that marginal changes in incentives will not induce 
technical change in the basic principles of technology, even if alternatives are available. 
A widespread energy transition demands higher-level innovation to build up entirely new 
energy systems. This process will take time and will not occur spontaneously from market 
processes. It will involve intensive exchange of intangible goods and other services difficult 
to value and appropriate, decision-making under strong uncertainty, choice against large 
sunken costs, and other advantages from learning and cumulativeness, all factors that make 
the case for strong coordination and planning. However, most international efforts to deal 
with mitigation and adaptation to climate change are running precisely into the opposite 
direction. 
Carbon Markets: drawbacks of privatization  
The current institutional framework, delineated by the Kyoto Protocol, establishes three 
financial instruments aimed at facilitating emission cuts: Carbon Emission Trading, Joint 
Implementation the Clean Development Mechanisms (see for example Schmalensee, 1998). 
The goal of these instruments, known as Flexible Mechanisms, is to reduce mitigation cost. 
Carbon Emission Trading (CET) constitutes the backbone of Flexible Mechanisms, and it 
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absorbs most of organizational and financial resources devoted to climate change 
institutions.  
CET or “Cap and Trade” schemes are supposed to influence the normal procedures of 
valuation and allocation of economic activity through a system of trading allowances. Its 
theoretical foundation is a theorem by R. Coase’s that states that if property rights exist, 
private arrangements would guarantee optimal allocation of resources and optimize 
pollution, independently of the distribution of rights  (Ellerman et al., 2003). Practical 
application of Coase’s theorem is due to J.H. Dales who first advanced to idea of 
controlling pollution via emission markets. Emission Trading was first applied by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control emissions sulphur-dioxide in power 
facilities, in 1976. Three the Agency set emission targets for polluting facilities and in 1990 
the Clean Air act Amendments established the specificities of the trading program (ibid.). 
 “Cap and Trade” schemes function in the following way. The government establishes a cap 
or maximum level of pollution for a certain period, and distributes accordingly a given 
number of allowances or permits to selected polluters. Emissions are to be monitored and 
those who emit beyond their allowance will be fined, in order to keep overall emissions to 
the level of the cap. Allegedly, trading allows the convergence to the cap to occur in a cost-
effective way. On the supply side, the promise to obtain a flow of cash by selling unused 
allowances would become an incentive to reduce emissions. On the demand side, it is 
argued, those who face expensive emission reductions would save by buying available 
allowances from those who were able to carry on large emission cuts at a low cost. These 
schemes are promoted as “win-win” solutions to pollution control, since firms with high 
mitigation costs can buy permits at a lower cost, while firms with low mitigation costs earn 
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money by reducing emissions and selling permits. The government controls scarcity 
according to strategic goals by setting the cap, while the market is supposed to allocate 
available resources in the most economical way to fit under the cap. 
Despite their alleged advantages, CET schemes have strong handicaps that must be 
seriously considered before assigning them an hegemonic role in mitigation policy. 
1. On the theoretical side, there are serious contentions that they are based on flawed theory. 
Specifically, Coase’s theorem has been disputed as a consistent mechanism of efficient 
allocation. According to Nadal (2008), the underlying bargaining process does not 
necessarily produce the outcome of social efficiency in the sense of Pareto, even in the 
simple case of a bilateral monopoly. On one hand, the results of bargaining may not be 
independent of the distribution of rights; on the other, negotiations may reach mutually 
beneficial positions for the incumbents that fall outside the region of socially optimal 
contracts. The alleged efficiency of these kind of markets cannot is not supported by a 
consisted theory. 
2. Carbon markets do not strictly “internalize” the cost of GHG emissions. They are argued 
to save the effort and difficulties of calculating emission costs, by relying rather on the 
exchange value of emissions rights set by the market. The environmental “cost” on the 
political decision that sets the cap. However, the latter is not the outcome of a market 
process, not even the outcome of a democratic process, but rather the result of a real-politik 
process bargaining and lobbying between governmental agencies, parliaments, and 
involved corporations. In this sense the CET scheme, “rather than providing an antidote to 
the problems of complex decision-making that plague traditional regulation, provides a 
layer of additional complications and occasions for dispute.” (Driesen, 1998). 
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3. Allowances are ‘assets…owned by the company concerned… and as such represent a 
significant and immediate creation of value to companies’ (Lohman, p. 77). How are these 
assets created from nothing? Basically, allowances or quotas worth something because they 
have exchange value: the can be traded for other assets. “The new carbon commodity is 
ghostly only in the sense that it’s up to governments and governments alone to decide – on 
whatever grounds they choose, scientific or not – how scarce it is, and how much can be 
distributed, bought, sold and used.” (Ibid, p. 79). The creation of carbon markets, and the 
underlying distribution of property rights, is then highly dependant on political decisions 
and power leveraging. Interest groups will continuously push for changes in allocation 
driven by the enormous rents at stake (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 343). By relying on the 
distribution of pseudo-property rights (assets which represent a stream of income), 
emissions trading schemes introduce a distributional aspect that is essentially unequal and 
unjust. 
4. The governments’ dilemma is that they cannot make pollution trading programs flexible 
and credible at the same time. The goal o reducing emissions “pulls trading systems one 
way – toward giving regulators a free hand to modify allowances.” But at the same time 
“Governments’ need to reassure traders that they will not be expropriated unfairly pulls 
another way – towards protecting allowances against government modification and making 
them as much like full title as possible” (Lohman, p. 82). At the same time, this makes the 
political process of lowering the cap (or introducing a “ratchet”) more difficult as the 
mechanism creates strong vested interests. The excess supply of allowances that plagued 
the European Carbon Market and eventually caused carbon prices to plummet exemplifies 
the type of difficulties in balancing political viability of the mechanisms with effectiveness. 
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5. Another important handicap of CET schemes is that they can in principle produce 
fictional emissions reductions through very complex procedures and rules that result 
difficult to evaluate and monitor. Unlike real markets, sellers and buyers find incentives to 
inflate reductions, making it very difficult to assess calculus of baseline, credits, and 
additionality. 
6. CET mechanisms will tend to reduce mitigation efforts: if mitigation rate increases, 
carbon price will fall, stalling further mitigation.
8
 If there are many cost-effective carbon 
saving projects in line but carbon credit demand is stalled (due to initial excess supply of 
allowances, or in the case of reduced capacity utilization), the market solution creates an 
incentive to hold back mitigation investments. Society losses twice, by missing cost-
effective investments, as well as the derived learning gains and scale economies. 
Particularly in the case of poor countries, extensive dependence on CET flows from the 
Clean Development Mechanism
9
 would rather damp than foster an articulated response to 
low-carbon transition, crowding-out local investment from “cheapest” mitigation efforts 
and probably even sucking-in local resources in order to “facilitate” corporate investment 
oriented to maximize private profiting. 
7. CET schemes, as markets of other pollutants are extremely volatile due to the short-term 
rigidity of supply and demand. This aspect questions seriously the ability and accuracy to 
produce effective signals for long-term choices as those involved in mitigation investment. 
Futures and other speculative instruments are equally questionable. 
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 It is in this sense that emission trading schemes provide “equal measure of under-compliance and over-
compliance incentives, inducing less innovation than a performance-based standard to which everyone has 
incentive to comply” (Taylor, et al, 2005. p. 372). 
9
 According to art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries are entitled to finance mitigation projects in 
developing countries and receive in exchange a Certificate of Emissions Reduction (CER), a form of carbon 
credit. This instrument is called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
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8. The short-term cost-benefit selection criteria implicit in CET schemes will most likely 
bias technology choices towards lowest-cost options and incremental change, without 
hierarchically distinguishing among innovations. This aspect is crucial and should be 
explored in detail. Carbon trading schemes are based on premises about the allocation 
process of existing resources, ignoring that mitigation is innovation: it is all about creating 
new resources. Mitigation efforts are fundamentally technology choices and in this sense 
they are “structural” decisions: they change the range of available choices in future 
decisions. It is well accepted in the literature on technical change that feedback from past 
decisions, as well as other sources of local increasing returns (sunken costs, learning 
economies, and technical interrelatedness), introduce self-reinforcing mechanisms in the 
trajectory of technological change (Arthur, 1989). Under these circumstances, the relative 
superiority among choices is not independent of the sequence in which choices are made. 
Once a technology is chosen among options, knowledge about it will improve, specific 
infrastructure will be deployed, and fixed resources will be installed, increasing the 
attractiveness for choosing this technology in the future. There are many consequences 
relevant for theory and policy making, but one of the most relevant here is that markets can 
select suboptimal technologies, and “crystallizing” resources for a very long time.
10
 
Technological change is an open process, subjected to the effect of cumulative causation 
that can potentially exhibit multiple equilibria and lock-in. 
By favoring incremental change on the permits supply side and prolonging high-carbon 
emissions on the permits demand side, these schemes will reinforce established processes 
and technologies. This feature is relevant when considering the above argument about 
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  See Arthur (1988, 1994) for theoretical demonstrations, and David (1985) and Cowan (1991) for empirical 
cases. 
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current carbon-intensive technologies being locked-in or “entrenched.” With technologies 
enjoying increasing returns to adoption, marginal improvements only dig deeper into the 
dominant regime’s advantages. By privileging private benefits and ignoring social returns 
CET will sacrifice dynamic for static efficiency, becoming an ineffective tool for systemic 
structural change. 
9. There is another aspect of dynamic efficiency closely related to the previous one. As 
argued, without higher-level coordination CET schemes are more likely to select earlier the 
lowest-cost mitigation projects, not those with a stronger mitigation potential from a 
system’s point of view. But it is a well known fact that systems’ optimization cannot be 
attained by optimizing components in isolation. Especially in large technological systems, 
like those of energy supply-chains, radical innovation involves institutional coordination 
involving several types of institutions (firms, governments, regulatory agencies, technical 
standards, property rights, etc.; see Hughes, 1983, for a classical reference).  It is not clear 
whether CETs will obstacle or facilitate this kind of coordination, but they will definitely 
not provide for it. 
10. Finally, a dominant focus on carbon trading schemes fails at addressing the broader and 
most important issue of technological transfer and public investment in research, 
demonstration, deployment, and development. The underlying assumption is that trading 
incentives in combination with strong enforcement of intellectual property rights would 
generate the necessary incentives to invest in R&D and technology transfer. This argument 
does not consider the obvious fact that IPRs are actually intended to deter technological 
imitation and condition technology transfer to direct investment or royalty payments. 
Especially in the context of developing countries, IPRs do not facilitate, and in practice 
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they tend to block, the accumulation of technical capabilities and knowledge for assessing, 
imitating, improving, and eventually mastering technologies. 
CDM’s and Carbon Credit mechanisms present additional problems. There are risks of 
emerging conflict of interests on the part of private consultants assessing Emission 
Reduction Projects. But the basic problem is that measuring emissions is completely 
different from measuring carbon credits. First, to have access to the CDM, a mitigation 
project must demonstrate non-additionality, that is, that the project would have been 
impossible without carbon finance. But this is actually highly problematic, due to the 
‘impossibility of measuring or even defining savings that are additional to those that would 
have occurred in the absence of emissions credit” (Grubb, 1999, p. 138). Second, carbon 
credits are calculated as saving from “business as usual” baseline, chosen among many 
plausible options of future. But this choice is basically a political decision, rather than an 
economic or technical prediction. “’Emissions reductions’ for many projects can be 
expected to differ by hundreds of percent given only small changes in initial assumptions” 
(Lazarus, 2003). Lack of verifiability opens the way for “creative accounting” and artificial 
creation of carbon credits. Third, CDMs generates a perverse incentive to delay mitigation 
policies in developing countries in order to enlarge the baseline from which emissions cuts 
will be calculated in the future. Finally, due to the relatively small amount of resources 
made available by the CDM mechanism, strong competition may result deleterious with 
respect to local benefits of investment, eventually triggering a “race to the bottom” in 
standards similar to that resulting from competition on other types of international 
investment. 
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These handicaps do not necessarily lead to discard completely market mechanisms as 
instruments to promote mitigation. But they cannot be expected to function as self-
regulating, efficient, non-distortive mechanisms, or as the backbone of every mitigation 
strategy. Without the proper institutional setting, a hands-off approach to market solutions 
will generate distributional distortions, slow innovation, and inefficient allocation of 
resources. In particular, developing countries are at risk of loosing strategic control and 
decision power over their technological base when relying passively on CET for defining a 
mitigation strategy. Below we argue that instead of relying solely or even mainly on market 
mechanisms, mitigation policies at the national level would be more effective and efficient 
if they take a hands-on, industrial and technology policy orientation. 
Technology: innovation and systemic change 
Mitigation strategies consistent with the speed and degree of structural change demanded to 
reach precautionary GHG stabilization levels must consider technical change in a more 
realistic way.  
One can summarize a realistic approach to technological change by highlighting three main 
features. First, technological development is a profit-driven, cumulative learning process, 
induced by the promise of obtaining monopolistic rents in real-competitive markets. Second, 
technology is not a public good similar to information: it is made up of costly packages of 
physical and intellectual resources, including skills and knowledge that can only be 
acquired through experience. Third: technological decisions are embedded in their 
application environment, which is crucial to understand the dynamics of technological 
change. These features of technological change have important implications for mitigation 
policies: 
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1. Technology diffusion is not automatic, but dependent on a multifactor selection process 
determining adoption thresholds (David, 1969). Such thresholds can be highly unresponsive 
to changes in relative prices, making market selection mechanisms impotent to attain 
objective mitigation goals. Barriers to adoption would tend to be country, sector, and even 
technology specific. 
2. Diffusion and technology choice are subjected to (transient) local increasing returns 
from learning. Feedback between investment and learning by doing can create waves of 
investment biased to certain technological configurations. Technologies that benefit from 
investment flows are more explored and eventually become cheaper; in turn, profit rates of 
those technologies increases, making subsequent investments more attractive. From the 
perspective of latent new GHG mitigation technologies, the argument works the other way 
around. As long as investment is kept off from alternative technologies, the latter will 
remain unexplored and expensive. Tapping the development potential of technological 
alternatives by redirecting investment flows into niches of use and explorative fields 
becomes crucial for increasing diversity and breaking the inertia of carbon-intensive 
technologies “crystallized” in the capital stock. 
3. Technology is embedded in technology regimes, which interconnect firms’ production 
and technology flows, innovations rules, and institutions. These organs define, focus and 
solve technical problems, and depend to a great extent on the processing, adaptation, and 
socialization of technical knowledge. Their degree of development will strongly vary across 
countries. The industry’s response to incentives is processed and determined by the 
workings of these regimes. In the case of GHG emissions mitigation, relevant technologies 
exhibit immense variety and specificities, some sectors may only need shifting standards up 
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(car motors, housing energy), others would require changing conditions for technology 
adoption, control, and diffusion. Market incentives are useless without intervention into the 
surrounding systems that are carriers of change. This, together with the argument of un-
tradability of technical skills and knowledge, implies that large-scale technological 
development depends strongly on the development of a minimum base of learning 
infrastructure and investment in local capabilities. 
When technology adoption takes place under conditions of increasing returns (due to 
learning by doing, technical interrelatedness, etc.) a coordinated process that values social 
gains is more likely to avoid choosing an inferior technology, in comparison to a market 
process (Cowan, 1991). However, even a coordinated process cannot totally avoid lock-ins. 
The policy lesson of technology choice under increasing returns is that governments and 
other higher-level institutions must promote technological variety even when it increases 
short-term costs of technological development under the rationale that social gains will be 
higher in the longer term. 
Due to the long-term nature of fixed assets in the energy sector, diffusion of mitigation 
technologies in energy generating, energy-intensive, and other capital intensive industries 
will be highly dependent on macro-economic factors determining capital turnover rates, 
like rates of interest, demand growth rates, and the wage rate. Mitigation will require sound 
macroeconomic environments. 
Radical innovations like new energy and transport systems require specific incentives to 
develop. Renewable energy is geographically specific, intermittent, and strongly dependent 
on interconnection systems, as well as on public infrastructure. There are many models to 
develop renewable energies, but not all of them provide the same local benefits. 
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Developing countries in particular should aim at maximum involvement in technology 
transfer by constructing and expanding local innovation systems and appropriate 
technology. Solid local infrastructures improve adaptation, faster advance and learning, and 
improved economic and social benefits like energy security and independence, value added 
creation, and social control of technology. Mitigation and development are not alternative 
paths, but under the proper strategy they can become powerful self-reinforcing dynamics. 
Investment in public infrastructure, research and development facilities, and education is 
crucial to construct effective systems for learning, socializing, an improving technical 
knowledge and technology selection criteria. 
Discussion: new institutions for structural change 
Climate change strategies oriented to fulfill the kind of structural change necessary to bend 
economic systems towards low-carbon profiles demand policy space to implement 
industrial, technological, and energy policies based on well-defined technical standards. As 
shown by historical experience on successful industrialization, technology-oriented 
development works better when private investment is subjected to specific mechanisms that 
balance support with disciplinary control (see Amsden, 2001; Chang, 2002). However, 
global institutions have evolved in the last three decades into a direction that has 
systematically reduced national policy space (Gallagher, 2005).  
A global mitigation strategy requires, first, a new institutional framework that guarantees a 
credible, fair, and effective mechanism for regulating the international use of the 
atmosphere without disrupting the carbon cycle, following the precautionary principle 
stated in the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism should consider common but differentiated 
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responsibility, as well as differentiated capacity. A credible consensus must include 
democratic procedures of agreement, as well as effective monitoring and enforcement. 
Second, global mitigation demands a broader degree of policy space at the national level to 
instrument flexible, adaptive mechanisms to foster innovation. Transition to low-carbon 
economies requires to un-lock entrenched technical systems and re-direct structural change 
towards a lower use of energy and materials. Market mechanisms are unable to facilitate 
this transition without strong guidance and complementary instruments. National strategies 
must therefore take a technology-oriented approach to mitigation and design sector specific 
policy package taking advantage of a broader toolbox of instruments: a) carbon taxes; b) 
technology standards; c) subsidies to adoption of renewable energy, local technological 
learning, and traditional agricultural systems. Additionally policy packages should include 
investment funds labeled at the sub-national level in order to support economic and 
environmental adaptation of less-privileged communities. These policies should be 
designed and adapted following national interests and local characteristics of the productive 
structure. The reconstruction of state and social capacities to re-orient coordinately 
economic development is imperative. This task faces formidable institutional barriers 
erected in the last two decades of free trade and investment agreements. 
Systemic change demanded by GHG mitigation cannot be reduced to technical efficiency 
and changes in fuel mixes. It is imperative to redirect development goals from ever-
increasing material wealth towards the satisfaction of radical necessities and a sustained 
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